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1. Introduction 
 
Fallacy theory has not been my particular concern until now – even if I spoke here and there 
about fallacies; mainly about the two specimens which I consider to be of the highest importance 
for argumentation theory. I mean “Ad baculum” and “Begging the question”. In fact I was not 
aware that a defense of fallacy theory was necessary because I had taken the criticisms of late to 
be mainly relying on a lack of clarity, confusion and exaggeration. Despite this estimation I will 
begin with stating that I agree with most of Aikin’s well minded proposals and solutions. 
Nevertheless I will provide some comments which hopefully can contribute to a fruitful 
discussion. They follow the sections of the paper. 
 
2. The generality problem  
 
As far as I have understood it the author is indeed tackling two problems here, the second one 
being a corollary of the first. We have no unified answer to what fallacies are and therefore we 
might face difficulties in identifying them in our texts. Aikin presents four rather different 
definitions and arrives at the summating phrase, “all theory of fallacy is a theory of how one fails 
to do what one ought in argument” (p.3). This statement is then completed with the consideration 
“that certain argumentative failures are pregnant with meaning about what argument should do, 
how it should work” (p.4). Of course, he is right with that. 
I would like to add that the fallacies, however, exhibit that pregnancy in different degrees 
(so that the metaphor of “pregnant” is at odds here). “Ad baculum” and “Begging the question” 
are particularly instructive for the concept of argument – whereas e.g. “Affirming the 
consequent” or “Post hoc – propter hoc” are less interesting in that regard. 
One may be inclined to believe that the problem of the definition of fallacy is only the 
inverse problem of the definition of argument but I think that would be a hasty conclusion. The 
fallacies of the traditional list of some 25 specimens point to so many different aspects of an 
argument that it is indeed somewhat preposterous to look for a common quality – besides the fact 
that they are all mistakes in argument. Why is that a problem? We can imagine indefinitely many 
faults in argument, but we do not want to list indefinitely many fallacies. A fallacy has 
something about it. Traditionally it is so, that it is not only false but that its falseness is covert 
under the appearance of being right. This is the issue of Aikin’s “Seem-Talk” (fallacies are 
arguments that seem to be good ones but are flaws), which has come under critique because the 
“seem” refers to a subject to whom it seems so. Very obviously these are not all speakers, so who 
is it? Is that a grave question? We could call fallacies “trap-schemes”, which would indicate that 
users have to pay attention not to step into the trap. This would as well take into account that 
fallacies are not always fallacious, that there are also correct usages.    
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The second half of the generality problem is the relation of abstract concepts to concrete reality. 
It is by no means specific for the concept of fallacy. Someone who learned what a unicorn is, 
might still be in doubt whether a cow that has lost a horn, is one. If doubt arises about the 
application of a definition we usually try to sharpen the definition. Aikin, however, seems to 
move in the opposite direction. He proposes to develop “a metalanguage for argumentative 
criticism” (p. 7f) so that fallacy charges should be taken as “putting nuance on an argument, 
requiring clarification, developing in a critical discussion” (loc. cit). This is plain, but I do not 
quite understand why this should no longer be guided by the knowledge about certain schemes, 
known as being in risk of mistake.  
  
3. The scope problem 
 
This is the problem that fallacy theory has no clear demarcational criteria. I doubt that this is a 
serious problem. Do we have clear demarcational criteria for politics, for philosophy, for cultural 
studies, for games, jokes? Aikin is aware that with his modest solution to the generality problem, 
demarcations are even more fading away, because there is no longer a complete list of well-
defined schemes on the agenda, but only more or less standardized ways of critical discussion. 
Fallacy theory may thus dissolve into “a metalanguage of challenge for reasoning” (p. 10), 
whose differentiation depends on the respective cases. I think one can easily agree with this 
characterization – without giving up on the established forms of “fallacies”. For Aikin, however, 
this is supposed to be once more a “modest solution” of one of the problems about fallacy theory. 
 
4. The negativity problem 
 
This seems to be the biggest one. It took Aikin 7 pages (i.e. more than the other two together) to 
modestly defend fallacy theory against the accusation of its promoting negativity in 
argumentation theory. It is a fact that fallacy theory focuses on the critique of arguments instead 
of fostering the know-how of arguing well. Moreover it seems to nurture a general “Adversary 
Paradigm” which is supposed to be the covert pattern of a lot of argumentative exchange 
anyway. 
The author’s “modest defense” consists here mainly in some mindful clarification. He 
states that argumentation is a normative practice and that in any normative practice there are 
intrinsic oughts and ought-nots. As also the ought-nots have to be cared for in argumentation “a 
minimal degree of dialectical adversariality is part of any argumentative exchange” (p.13). I 
gladly agree with the content of this statement. Only I would like to sharpen it a little bit with 
regard to two aspects which I will allude under the headings of (a) “Critical supervision” and (b) 
“Adversariality”. 
 
(a) Critical supervision 
 
If we accept Aikin’s proposal to expose a metalanguage of critical reflection over all argument, 
this could best be achieved by conceiving argument in principle as a dialogical enterprise, i.e. a 
setting with two roles, called ‘proponent’ and ‘opponent’, where the opponent role executes a 
critical supervision over the steps of the proponent’s arguing. Now it should be clear: Critical 
supervision has per se nothing to do with adversariality. In any activity that needs attentive 
performance (e.g. car driving) I have to critically supervise myself – without assuming that I am 
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my own adversary. It is true that critical supervision performed within the hierarchical structure 
of educational institutions runs a risk of getting distorted and adulterated. But the more it is 
necessary, to care for a clear and sober regard upon the situation. 
 
(b) Adversariality 
 
We all agree in that argumentation is a practice that deserves attentive performance. We also 
agree in that things can go wrong there – unintentionally or even on purpose. Fallacy theory is an 
attempt to theorize about what can go wrong. As any other theorizing it may not achieve 
perfectly satisfying results. This does not impede us to value its outcome as a collection of forms 
of possible wrongs to which critical supervision should be attentive. 
The ways and means of teaching argument in a concrete class depend on material issues 
and on the background of teachers and students. It may be appropriate to put the stress on good 
argument, but it may also be appropriate to put the stress on fallacies. 
As in arguing also in teaching things can go wrong. When people’s argumentative flaws 
are treated in a disrespectful or adversary manner, then this is bad teaching and has to be 
criticized. The criticism, however, must be precise and distinctive. Of course, bad teaching is not 
the fault of fallacy theory, even less the fault of argumentation per se. 
Another thing may be of importance here. It is a general tendency of our individualistic 
cultures that people feel personally hurt when their utterances are criticized. This is a bad and 
dangerous cultural tendency.1 In the context of argumentation however, it is a blunt mistake to 
identify oneself with one’s claim so much that one feels hurt by critique. In the terminology of 
my book (The Concept of Argument, Springer 2014) this is the lack of the distinction between an 
“opinion” (which is indeed “mine” – see the German “Meinung”) and a “thesis” (which I put on 
the forum to find out if I can hold it). I think this is a paramount task of teaching argument or 
fallacies to direct students in realizing that argumentation is, if it is at all fruitful, an exercise in 
self-distancing, in balancing between commitment and distance.  
Upshot: There is no direct link from fallacy theory to adversariality, so that a defense of it 
(and yet a modest one) against that reproach is not necessary. 
 
Supplement 1: 
In ancient Greece where individualism originated with the Sophist movement, this tendency was 
also observed. Plato has taken account of it in an original way: If the omniscient viz. omni-
ignorant Socrates comes to a point where his interlocutor is already very much pressed and hopes 
to save his view with a last modification of his thesis, then Socrates does not plump forward with 
a decisive objection. Instead he invents a fictitious third dialogue partner who exhibits the 
objection. He says something like: “What if somebody asked you the following question—then, 
what would be your answer?” (e.g. in Meno 73b). Maybe this tactic could be adopted as a 
remedy for our individualistic disease. 
 
Supplement 2: 
 
The expression “adversary paradigm” should be seen as quarantinable. For one, the word 
“paradigm” stems from the philosophy of science, where it has rather been banned (scholars used 
to call it “the P-word”) because of its vague meaning that simply allows one to pump up all kinds 
                                                          
1 It has often been denounced since the conformity experiments of S. Ash in the early 50ies of 20th century. 
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of minor perspectives. The second disadvantage of the expression is that no objectifying 
definition of ‘adversary’ is at hand. If the sentence ‘A treats B in an adversary manner’ means 
nothing more than ‘B feels that A is treating her in an adversary manner’, then this is a problem. 
What about A’s intentions? Maybe A is not completely aware of them? Yes, but this cannot be 
an open door to all kinds of allegations. Therefore I recommend to abdicate the expression 
“adversary paradigm”. 
